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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050072-CA

vs.
CALVIN MOORE,
Defendant/Appellant.

AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals a conviction for aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004), and aggravated assault, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial
District Court in Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the performance of defendant's trial counsel fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness and was defendant prejudiced?

Standard of Review: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first
time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, U 13, 55 P.3d
1131, cert, denied, 63 P.3d 104 (2003).
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in not sua sponte providing defendant with new counsel
or granting an extension of time to file a motion for a new trial?
Standard of Review: These claims are unpreserved and are therefore reviewed for
plain error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that it could convict defendant of
both aggravated burglary and aggravated assault when, according to defendant, the crimes
should have merged?
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies because defendant agreed to the
jury instructions and any error is therefore invited. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^16,
— P.3d — (when error is invited, party has no right to appellate review).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004) (burglary)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004) (aggravated burglary)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) (aggravated assault)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2004) (merger)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged by information with aggravated burglary, mayhem,
and four counts of aggravated assault. R. 2-3. The State moved to dismiss the mayhem
charge and stipulated to dismissal of one of the aggravated assault counts during a
preliminary hearing on August 19, 2003. R. 33. Defendant was bound over on the
remaining counts. Id.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and aggravated burglary following a
jury trial on November 23 & 24, 2004. R. 249-51, 296-97, 350, 351. l
The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of five years to life on the
aggravated burglary charge and one to 15 years on aggravated assault. R. 314.
Defendant's trial counsel withdrew after defendant expressed a desire to raise a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 316-18.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 321.
On appeal, defendant filed a motion for remand to the trial court under rule 23B, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, for findings on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
This Court denied that motion on August 22, 2005, in part because his "vague assertions of
dissatisfaction do not establish that he was entitled to new counsel." Order Denying
Remand, dated August 22, 2005.

1

The State filed an Amended Information on November 23,2004, charging defendant
with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated burglary. R. 247-48.
Defendant was acquitted of one count of aggravated assault. R. 298.
3

In conjunction with the filing of its Opposition Brief, the State filed a Motion to Strike
Extra-Record Information from Appellant's Opening Brief. Pursuant to the State's motion,
this Court ordered defendant to file an amended brief without "references to documents not
included in the record on appeal..." Order, dated February 6, 2006, Addendum D.
Defendant filed his amended brief ("Amd. Aplt. Br.") on March 8, 2006, redacting
most but not all references to extra-record material.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Antoinette Jones: "I heard him laugh and then he said he just shot Marcus. "
Before defendant kicked down the door to her apartment, struck her in the face with a
pistol and shot her boyfriend, Antoinette Jones was having a nice evening. With her two
children asleep in a back room, Jones had been enjoying an intimate evening at home with
her live-in boyfriend, Marcus Anderson. R. 350:70-71,78. But defendant changed all that.
About 2:30 or 3 a.m. on February 5, 2003, Jones and Anderson heard a knock at the
door. R. 350:73. She looked through the peephole and saw the defendant and two men. R.
350:73,93. She recognized defendant because he was her sister's husband's cousin and had
visited her home. R. 350:97-98. She also knew him socially through drug use. R. 350:74.
The other men she knew only by their street names of "Little Wil" and "Mikey." R. 350:95.
She and Anderson did not want to open the door, so they hid in the shower. R.
350:75. Defendant kept pounding. Anderson told Jones not to answer, but she told him:
"He's not going to go away if we don't answer it." Id.
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She opened the door a crack to tell defendant they were asleep and to come back later.
Id. He told her to "open the fucking door." R. 350:76.
"[Tjhat's when I looked on the side of him and I seen the gun in his hand," she
recalled. Id.
She closed the door, but defendant started kicking it. R.350:76. She tried to get to the
door to her boys5 room to tell them not to come out. R. 350:77. Before she could do that,
the door flew open and defendant burst into the room. He immediately approached Jones
and struck her in the face with the gun, injuring her cheekbone and eye. R.350:78.
Defendant then noticed Anderson in the adjoining living room and pointed the gun at
him. Id. Jones looked to the two men accompanying defendant, one of whom had tears in
his eyes and mouthed a single word: "Run." R.350:81. She did. R. 350:79-80.
She first ran to her landlord's apartment. No one answered. R. 350:81. She went
downstairs to an apartment where she knew her sister, Bernice O'Neal Spillers, was staying
with her husband, David Spillers. Id. She rang the doorbell and while waiting for an
answer, she heard a voice from upstairs say, "Put your head up." She heard a gunshot just as
her sister opened the door. Id.
Jones entered the apartment, grabbed a cell phone and hid in the closet where she
called 911. R. 350:82. Soon, she heard defendant outside asking if she was inside. She
heard her sister say: "No. What happened?" Id.

2

David Spillers is also defendant's cousin. R. 350:127.
5

"I heard him [defendant] laugh and then he said he just shot Marcus/5 Jones testified.
R. 350:83.
Bernice O 'Neal Spillers: "[H]e said, [(]I just shot that nigger Marcus[']. "
Bemice O'Neal testified that her sister was scared and crying when she entered the
apartment. R. 350:129.
"She said she wanted the phone, that Calvin had just came and kicked her door in and
had hit her with the gun upside her face or in her face by her eye/' O'Neal said. " . . . I
remember her eye was messed up." Id.
The two of them heard the gunshot upstairs and Jones hid in the closet. Moments
later, O'Neal heard the doorbell ring. R. 350:130.
"And it was him [defendant], and he said he was just coming by to let us know that he
was leaving town. And we was like, [']Rightnow?[']. Andhewaslike[']Yeah.[']. And we
asked why, and he said, [']I just shot that nigger Marcus[']." R. 350:130.
After defendant left, O'Neal ran up to her sister's apartment where she found the door
kicked in. R. 350:131. She saw blood, but could not see anyone. Her nephews came out of
their bedroom and she told them their mom was safe. Anderson then came out of hiding and
told her he had gotten shot in the hand, which she could see was bleeding. Id.
Marcus Anderson: "I asked him not to shoot me in the foot . ."
Anderson described defendant as a "friend of a Mend" and said the two occasionally
used drugs together. R. 350:146. He also said that defendant was a drug dealer who
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occasionally "fronted" drugs to Anderson on credit. In fact, he said he owed defendant $30
for drugs and he surmised that was the reason defendant confronted him. R. 3 50:159,163-64
Anderson said that after Jones fled the apartment, defendant approached him and said:
"I should shoot you in the foot" R. 350:149.
"I asked him not to shoot me in the foot so he asked me to put my hand up," Anderson
recalled. R. 350:150.
Defendant then shot him in the hand from about two inches away. R. 350:150-51.
Investigators later found a bullet hole in the wall with blood and bone fragments around it.
R. 350:113-14.
Defendant: "I was home at the time. "
Although he acknowledged that he knew all three eyewitnesses—O'Neal since 1996,
Jones and Anderson for about three months—defendant flatly denied he committed the
crimes or that he was anywhere near Jones' apartment early on February 5, 2003. R.
351:191-93.
"I was at home at the time," he testified. "I got home about 1:15, 1:20, somewhere
about that area... Got into an argument with my wife because she was—she assumed I was
cheating when I wasn't... I called for a ride, my ride came, and I left." R. 351:193.
Defendant claimed Jenna West, a friend, picked him up and dropped him off at the
home of another friend, Tuan Jones, where he spent the night. R. 351:193,197. He said his
wife called him a few days later and told him the police had contacted her and were saying
he was involved in an aggravated burglary at Jones' house. R. 351:194.
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Lora Moore, defendant's wife, corroborated part of his testimony. She said that he
came home late and she accused him of cheating on her. R. 350:120. She threw a glass of
water on him and also threw his clothes around. R. 350:122. He left about 1:30 or 2 a.m.,
but she did not see him leave with anyone. R. 350:121.
Jenna West could not be located until the eve of trial when a State's investigator
contacted her in Florida, where she was on "an extended family trip." R. 350:6. She told the
State's investigator that she was unwilling to testify because she was not with defendant on
the date in question and she refused to take the stand and lie for him. R. 350:6-7. Ultimately,
West did not testify, but the State and defendant stipulated to what her testimony would have
been and agreed to have it read into the record:
Jenna West is a friend of Calvin Moore. She has on occasion associated
with the defendant. She recalls on one occasion she was called by the
defendant sometime after midnight to pick him up because he had a fight with
his wife. She does not remember the date or month, but that it was in the
wintertime. She dropped him off several hours later.
R. 351:207.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective. First, because the evidence
against defendant was so overwhelming, defendant's burden to demonstrate prejudice is
extremely heavy and defendant has not met that burden. Second, defendant has not
demonstrated deficient performance or prejudice for any of the specific claims of
ineffectiveness he raises. Accordingly, his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
fail.
8

Point II: The trial court did not err in not sua sponte appointing new counsel or
granting defendant additional time to file a motion for a new trial. The court granted trial
counsel's motion to withdraw within days after the motion was filed and promptly
appointed substitute counsel. The trial court did not err in not granting defendant
additional time to file a motion for a new trial because no motion was ever filed and
defendant had additional time after his counsel withdrew to file the motion himself or
obtain substitute counsel. In any event, a new trial motion was without merit and would
not have been granted. Therefore, even if the trial court should have granted additional
time, the error was harmless.
Point III: Defendant was properly convicted of both aggravated burglary and
aggravated assault. Under the facts of this case, the two crimes do not merge and the trial
court did not err in giving the jury instructions allowing them to convict him of both
charges.
ARGUMENT
L

DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HIS TRIAL
COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE
STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS.3

Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for (1) not presenting witnesses
favorable to the defense; (2) not objecting to the admission of "prejudicial" evidence; and

This section of the State's brief responds to point IV of the appellant's amended
brief.
9

(3) not exposing the biases of two of the victims. See Amd. Aplt. Br at. 18-20. These
claims fail.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must establish that his
attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To meet the performance
prong, defendant must show counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Id at 688, 690. To do so, he must overcome the strong presumption that
counsel provided constitutionally effective performance. Id. at 689-91; see also State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^[19, 12 P.3d 92 (to establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy") (citation and quotation omitted). To
establish that such serious errors occurred, defendant must identify counsel's specific acts or
omissions that "fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." State v.
Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 532 (Utah App.) (citations omitted and internal quotation marks
omitted), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (1997). "'[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.'" State v. Penman, 964
P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah
1993)) (brackets in original).
Furthermore, it is not enough for petitioner to show that counsel's performance could
have been better. The Sixth Amendment entitles petitioner "only to effective assistance of
counsel, not to the best or most complete representation available." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d
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1250, 1259 (Utah 1993). The court may find counsel's performance constitutionally
deficient only if petitioner establishes that counsel's performance was "completely
unreasonable, not merely wrong." Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999), cert
denied, 528 U.S. 1167 (2000). Even the best criminal defense attorneys may disagree on the
way to defend a particular client. State v. Orr, 940 P.2d 42 (1997). To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance, appellant must demonstrate "'that counsel's actions were not
conscious trial strategy,'" and "that there was a 'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for
counsel's actions." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627,635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v.
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah. App. 1992))
To meet his burden under the second, prejudice prong of the Strickland'test, petitioner
must show that he was actually harmed by any alleged deficiencies. Petitioner must
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1225. The courts have defined a reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Defendant cannot demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice. Accordingly, his
ineffective assistance claims fail.
A. Because the Evidence Against Him Was Overwhelming, Defendant's
Burden To Show Prejudice Is Extremely High.
In the following sections, the State will demonstrate specifically that defendant's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot succeed because defendant has failed to
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show deficient performance or prejudice. As a preliminary matter, however, it should be
noted that even assuming counsel performed deficiently, defendant's burden to demonstrate
prejudice from any of counsel's alleged errors is extremely high because the evidence against
him was overwhelming. Antoinette Jones and Marcus Anderson—both of whom could
readily identify defendant because he had been a guest in their home as well as a companion
in drug use—testified that defendant showed up on their doorstep at 2 or 3 a.m. and
demanded to be let in. R. 350:73-76, 143-45, 147. They also testified that when they
refused, defendant kicked down the door, entered and immediately struck Jones in the face
with handgun. R. 350:76, 78, 143-44, 147-48. Anderson testified that defendant then
threatened to shoot him in the foot, but finally shot him in the hand instead. R. 350:149-51.
Afterward, defendant went downstairs to the apartment of his cousin, David Spillers, and
admitted that he had just shot Anderson. R. 350:83, 130.
This testimony, which was contradicted only by defendant's unsubstantiated alibi,
created a virtually insurmountable obstacle for defendant. As shown below, he has not met
his burden to overcome the formidable evidence against him.
B.

Trial Counsel Properly Investigated the Case and Presented
Testimony from Defendant's Alleged "Alibi" Witness.

Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not ensuring that "an
important alibi witness" was available to testify for the defense. Amd. Aplt. Br. at 18. He
also claims that trial counsel "similarly didn't attempt to identify the two eyewitnesses at the
scene of the crime." Amd. Aplt. Br. at 20. These claims fail.
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At trial, defendant testified that during the time the burglary and assault occurred, he
was with a friend, Jenna West, who had picked him up at his home and dropped him off at
another friend's house, where he spent the night. R. 351:193,197. West did not testify, but
the State and defendant stipulated to what her testimony would have been and the judge read
it into the record:
Jenna West is a friend of Calvin Moore. She has on occasion associated
with the defendant. She recalls on one occasion she was called by the
defendant sometime after midnight to pick him up because he had a fight with
his wife. She does not remember the date or month, but that it was in the
wintertime. She dropped him off several hours later.
R. 351:207.
Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not having West testify in
person. Defendant does not acknowledge, however, that West was uncooperative and that
she claimed she was not with defendant the night of the burglary and assault and did not
want to perjure herself. R. 350:6-7. Nor does he acknowledge that his trial counsel went to
great lengths to locate West and procure her testimony. A year before trial, the defense had
located West and listed her name and address on a witness list. R. 118-21. Defense
investigators spoke with her early in the case and she stated that she remembered picking
defendant up one night after he had a fight with his wife, but she did not remember the date.
R. 350:7-8. Trial counsel said he spoke with her a "couple of times" before trial. R. 350:8.
The trial court rescheduled a trial date in June 2004 when West could not be located. R. 230.
As the new trial date approached in November 2004, defense counsel was unable to locate
West and became concerned that she was avoiding service of a subpoena by not answering
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her door or telephone. R.243-46. In an effort to secure her attendance at trial, defense
counsel obtained a material witness warrant for her arrest. R. 245. Immediately before trial,
investigators for both the State and the defense attempted to locate West to arrange for her
testimony. Finally, on the eve of trial, she was located in Florida where she was on an
"extended family trip." R. 350:6. She told the State's investigator that she was unwilling to
testify because she was not with defendant on the date in question and refused to take the
stand and lie for him. R. 350:6-7.
Clearly, defendant's trial counsel understood the importance of West's testimony. He
interviewed her, subpoenaed her and even tried to have her arrested. Defendant does not say
what else he thinks should have been done and it is hard to imagine what other steps counsel
could have taken. Defense counsel's performance was not deficient.
Nonetheless, assuming defendant's trial counsel was deficient in his efforts to procure
West's testimony at trial—a rather far-fetched assumption—defendant still was not
prejudiced given that the substance of her testimony was presented to the jury. Indeed,
presenting her testimony by stipulation was better for defendant because if she had testified
in person, her comment to the State's investigator—that she did not believe the night she
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picked him up was the night of the burglary/assault—would surely have come out. R. 350:67. In sum, defendant suffered no prejudice from the lack of live testimony from West.4
C.

Defendant's Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Not Attempting
to Exclude an Investigator's Summary of West's Testimony or
Anderson's Testimony Concerning His Drug Debt to Defendant.

Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not attempting to exclude
alleged hearsay testimony from a State investigator concerning the interview with West.
Amd. Aplt. Br. at 19. He also claims that counsel should have attempted to exclude
testimony by Anderson that defendant shot him because Anderson owed defendant $30 for
drugs. Id. These claims are without merit.
Before the trial began, Sgt. Kevin Judd, an investigator for the Salt Lake County
District Attorney's Office, testified about his efforts to contact West, the alleged alibi
witness. R. 350:19,21. Judd stated that he had contacted West on December 22,2003, and
that she said she did not want to testify because she was not with defendant the night the
crimes occurred. R. 350:20. He also stated that West had called him the night before trial
began. R. 350:24. She told him she was in Florida and would not be back in time to testify.
Id. She also said "she was not with Calvin Moore on that night, she will not come in and lie
for Calvin Moore, she told Kevin Kurumada [defendant's trial counsel] or whoever the

Defendant also claims that counsel was deficient for not investigating and identifying
the two men who the victims said accompanied defendant during the commission of the
burglary and assault. Amd. Aplt. Br. at 20. However, these men were never identified by
their real names and defendant provides nothing to suggest it was even possible to identify or
locate them.
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attorney was four months ago that she would not testify and lie for Calvin Moore." R.
350:25.
Defendant claims this testimony is hearsay and should have been excluded. Amd.
Aplt. Br. at 19. But defendant neglects to mention that this testimony was held outside the
presence of the jury. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for not attempting to exclude
Judd's testimony because it was never admitted at trial.
Defendant also claims that Anderson's testimony concerning his $30 drug debt was
prejudicial and should not have been admitted under rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence. Amd. Aplt. Br. at 19. Defendant is at least partly correct. The evidence is
prejudicial as almost all relevant evidence is, but it is not unfairly prejudicial, which is what
the rules of evidence prohibit. See Utah R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . . " ) . Moreover, the evidence was clearly
relevant because it provided a context for Anderson's relationship with defendant as well as
a motive for the assault. Thus, any attempt to exclude this evidence would have been futile
and counsel cannot be ineffective for not making futile objections. See State v. Kelley, 2000
UT 41, Tf26, 1 P.3d 546 ("[F]ailure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel").
D.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Allegedly Not Properly
Investigating and Exposing the Biases of Defendant's Victims.

Defendant claims that his trial attorney should have investigated and "expose[d] the
biases" of Marcus Anderson and Antoinette Jones. Amd. Aplt. Br. at 19. However,
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defendant never states how these witnesses are biased or what more defense counsel should
have done to discover their alleged biases. Defendant alludes cryptically to "their prior
associations with Mr. Moore," id., but it is unclear how their acquaintance with defendant
created bias. In fact, the opposite is true. Anderson testified that defendant was one of his
drug dealers, that the two sometimes took drugs together and that defendant often "fronted"
him drugs on credit. R. 350:162-63. Anderson stated that before defendant shot him, their
relationship had been untroubled. R.3 50:161. Jones said she wasfriendlywith defendant and
that he was generally welcome in her home, although she acknowledged that she had
occasionally asked defendant to leave. R. 350:97-98.
Because defendant has not identified what biases his trial counsel should have
discovered, he has not demonstrated deficient performance or prejudice and his claim fails.
See Classon, 935 P.2d at 532 (defendant must identify counsel's specific acts or omissions
that "fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance"); Penman, 964 P.2d
at 1162 ('"[Pjroof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but
must be a demonstrable reality'") (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
E.

Defendant's Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective
Withdrawing From the Case Earlier.

In Not

Despite this Court's order striking extra-record materialfromhis brief, see Addendum
D, defendant once again refers to the same extra-record material, albeit cryptically, in his
amended brief. On page 13 of his amended brief, defendant claims in an argument heading
that "Defense counsel was ineffective in not responding appropriately to Mr. Moore's
requests for a substitution of counsel and for not notifying the Court." This is the same
17

heading defendant used at the beginning of Point II of his unredacted brief. See Aplt.'s
Opening Brief at 14. Although defendant does not repeat the argument itself and notes that
he is declining to do so "[i]n deference to this Court's Order striking extra-record
information from Appellant's opening brief," the heading, too, is inappropriate because it
refers to information outside the record. In the interest of expediency and moving the case
along, the State will not renew its motion to strike. However, this reference to the extrajudicial material should be disregarded.
Moreover, the actual record does not support the claim that defendant's trial counsel
should have withdrawn earlier. The record below contains only a single unequivocal
indication that defendant became displeased with his attorney, and this did not occur until
after his conviction. During sentencing, defendant had a terse exchange with the trial judge,
who told defendant that his trial counsel "did a fine job in your defense—" Defendant cut
him off and retorted: "Bullshit." R. 352:9. Defendant went on to say that his counsel
"didn't do his job. That's what I'm telling you." R. 352:9-10. Following this outburst, trial
counsel immediately filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted. R. 316-18. Thus, it is
hard to see what defendant has to complain about. As soon as he voiced his dissatisfaction
with his attorney, trial counsel withdrew and substitute counsel was appointed. R. 319.
The only earlier indication in the record that defendant wanted a different attorney
was a letter he submitted to the court captioned "Plea for Withdraw[al] of Counsel and
Evidentiary Hearing." R. 233-34. The letter, however, does not state that defendant was
dissatisfied with his trial counsel, much less offer reasons for his alleged dissatisfaction.
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Rather, the entire letter concerns defendant's contention that the State should not be allowed
to present a medical report because the State "must have had access to this report" some time
before the State first made the report available to defendant. R. 233. The letter says nothing
to suggest a "conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an
irreconcilable conflict which [led] to an unjust verdict." State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 3 lm
947 P.2d 382, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1083(2000. Thus, defendant has not demonstrated that
his attorney had any reason to withdraw from the case any earlier than he did. Accordingly,
defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for not withdrawing sooner.
Nor has defendant shown prejudice. Even assuming that defendant's counsel had
some obligation to withdraw sooner, defendant has not identified errors that are reasonably
probable to have altered the outcome of the trial. See sections LA. through I.D, above.
Thus, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT TIMELY APPOINTED SUBSTITUTE
COUNSEL AND DID NOT ERR IN NOT SUA SPONTE
EXTENDING THE TIME TO FILE A MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.5

Defendant alleges that his due process rights were violated when the trial court "failed
to timely appoint substitute counsel" and did not sua sponte grant additional time for
defendant to file a motion for a new trial. Amd. Aplt. Br. at 10-18. Both claims are
meritless.

5

This section responds to points I and III of appellant's amended brief.
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As argued in section I.E, above, the trial court granted defendant's request for a new
attorney within days after defendant made his displeasure known and counsel moved to
withdraw. Defendant does not explain why or how the trial court should have or could have
intuited his alleged desire for new counsel at any earlier date. Accordingly, this claim fails.
Defendant also claims that the trial court should have sua sponte granted additional
time to file a motion for a new trial because his trial counsel withdrew and substitute counsel
was not appointed until after the 10-day period following sentencing for filing a new trial
motion. Amd. Aplt. Br. at 11. After sentencing, a defendant has 10 days to file a motion for
a new trial "or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period." Utah
R. Crim. P. 24(c).
As discussed above, defendant told the trial court during his sentencing hearing that
he was dissatisfied with his trial counsel's representation. R. 352:9-10. Following this
outburst, trial counsel immediately filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted. R. 31618. In the motion, trial counsel stated: "The defendant desires to file a motion for a new
trial, based on ineffective assistance of counsel." R. 316 (Motion to Withdraw, dated
January 3,2005). The trial court granted the motion to withdraw on January 6,2005, which,
according to defendant, was the last day for filing a motion for a new trial. Amd. Aplt. Br. at
11. According to defendant, these circumstances created a "unique glitch" which caused the
matter to "f[a]ll through the proverbial cracks" because trial counsel could not file a motion
for a new trial raising his own ineffectiveness and substitute counsel was not appointed in
time to file the motion. Id. at 10-11. Thus, according to defendant, the trial court should
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have sua sponte extended the time and its failure to do so effectively precluded defendant
from filing a motion for a new trial. Id. at 12.
In fact, the circumstances are not quite as Kafkaesque as defendant claims. The
deadline for filing a motion for a new trial was not, as defendant asserts, January 6, 2005.
Because the period for filing a new trial motion is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays are excluded, which means the actual deadline was January 10. Thus,
defendant did have a short window between the 6 and 10 of January when he or substitute
counsel could have filed either a timely motion for a new trial or a motion to extend the time.
Absent an actual motion for a new trial, and given that defendant had time after the court
granted the motion to withdraw to file the motion, the trial court did not err in not sue sponte
extending the deadline.
But even assuming arguendo that "a more prudent action"6 would have been for the
trial court to both grant the motion to withdraw and, at the same time, allow additional time
to file the motion for a new trial, defendant's claim still fails because any error was harmless.
See State v. Wood, 393 P.2d 381 (Utah 1964) (defendant bears burden to show prejudice
when claiming separation ofjurors during deliberation required new trial); see also Utah R.
Crim. P. 24(a) ("The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a
new trial in the interest ofjustice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party") (emphasis added); State v. Boyd, 2001UT 30, ^[27,

6

Amd. Aplt. Br. at 12.
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25 P.3d 985 (trial court has "broad discretion" to grant or deny timely motion for a new
trial). Defendant claims a new trial motion would have been granted based on the
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. See Amd. Aplt. Br. at 13. But, as demonstrated in
section I, above, defendant has not met and cannot meet his burden to demonstrate his
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient under Strickland. Because defendant
cannot demonstrate his counsel was deficient, a motion for new trial based a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel would necessarily have been denied. Thus, even if it would
have been more "prudent" for the trial court to extend the deadline, defendant suffered no
prejudice and his claim must fail.
III.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER; DEFENDANT
COMITTED BOTH AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.7

Defendant claims he was improperly convicted of aggravated burglary and
aggravated assault because the assault was a lesser-included offense and should have
merged into the burglary charge. Amd. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Defendant is incorrect.
A.

Defendant Agreed to the Jury Instructions He Now Challenges;
Thus, Error, If Any, Was Invited and Cannot Be Challenged On
Appeal.

Because defendant approved the instructions on the elements of aggravated burglary
and aggravated assault, he cannot challenge them on appeal. "[A] party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing

7

This section responds to point V of Appellant's Brief.
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the error." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). "Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be assigned as error even if such
instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction.5" State v.
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,19, 86 P.3d 742 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54,
70P.3d 111).
In Geukgeuzian, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed its caselaw and enumerated
several examples of invited error. Id. at \ 10. A defendant invites error when his counsel
"confirm[s] on the record that the defense had no objection to the instructions given by the
trial court." Id. (citing Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at f 55). A defendant also invites error where
he fails to object to an instruction when asked specifically by the court. Id. (citing Anderson,
929 P.2d at 1108-09). Finally, a defendant invites error when his counsel represents to the
court that she read the instruction and had no objection to it. Id. (citing State v. Medina, 73 8
P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)).
Similarly, here, defendant invited the alleged error. At the beginning of the second
day of trial, the court reviewed the instructions he intended to give to the jury with the State
and defendant. R. 351:185-87. After reviewing the instructions, the court stated: "And
that's it. Is that okay?" Defendant's counsel replied: "That sounds good." R. 351:187.
Clearly, defense counsel "confirmed on the record that the defense had no objection to the
instructions given by the trial court." Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at \ 10, (citing Hamilton,
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2003 UT 22 at f 55). Thus, any error was invited and defendant cannot challenge the
instructions on appeal.
B.

Defendant Was Properly Convicted Of Both Aggravated Burglary
and Aggravated Robbery.

Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim concerning the jury instructions,
the claim still fails because defendant was properly convicted of both offenses.
In Utah, "[a] defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision;..." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (West 2004). A defendant may be convicted
of a charged offense or a lesser-included offense, but not both. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(3) (West 2004). An offense is a lesser-included offense if "[i]t is established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged;..." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a) (West 2004). If a defendant is convicted of
both, the lesser charge merges into the greater. State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,243 (Utah App.
1997)
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-step analysis for determining whether
offenses stand in a lesser-included relationship to each other for purposes of merger under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995); State v.
Hill, 674 P.2d 96,97 (Utah 1983). "[T]he first step is a purely theoretical comparison of the
statutory elements of each offense." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; Hill, 61A P.2d at 97. Some
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criminal statutes, however, have multiple variations or elements, so that a greater-lesser
relationship may exist between some variations of the crimes, but not of others. Id. In such
a case, the court must look to the evidence presented at trial to determine what variation of
the crime or crimes was proved and then "look[] to the statutory elements of the crime to
determine whether it is an included offense." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^[16,994 P.2d
1243; accord Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861-62; Hill, 674 P.2d at 97.
Applying the comparative elements test set out in Finlayson and Brooks compels the
conclusion that although aggravated assault may be, under some circumstances, a lesserincluded offense of aggravated burglary, the two crimes do not merge in this case. A person
commits burglary if the actor "enters or remains unlawfully in a building . . . with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(West 2004). A person commits aggravated burglary "if in attempting, committing, or
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime... causes bodily injury
to any person who is not a participant in the crime . . . [or] uses or threatens the immediate
use of a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(l)(a)-(b) (West 2004). A person
commits aggravated assault if he commits assault and (a) intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or (b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(c) (West 2004).
Defendant claims that under State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985), his offenses
should merge. Bradley holds that where a defendant commits aggravated burglary by
"cus[ing] or threaten[ing] the immediate use of a dangerous or deadly weapon against any
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person who is not a participant in the crime' . . . aggravated assault is simultaneously
proven." Id. at 878. Thus, defendant argues, because the State relied on his use or threatened
immediate use of a dangerous weapon to establish aggravated burglary, the aggravated
assault charge against him must merge and the trial court erred in giving jurors the option of
convicting him of both charges. Amd. Aplt. Br. at 20-21.
Defendant misreads Bradley. In that case, the defendants were convicted of third
degree aggravated assault, which is established through the use or threatened use of a
dangerous weapon. Id. at 875; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b).

Under those

circumstances, the two crimes merged because the use or threatened use of a dangerous
weapon was also an element of the aggravated burglary charge in that case. Id. Conversely,
here, jurors convicted defendant of second degree aggravated assault because he
"intentionally cause[d] serious bodily injury to another"—e.g., Marcus Anderson.8 See Jury
Instruction 32, R. 291, Addendum B. This element is not necessary to defendant's
aggravated burglary conviction. Rather, jurors convicted defendant of aggravated burglary
because in the course of burglarizing the home of Anderson and Ragsdale he either (1)
inflicted "bodily injury9 to any person who was not a participant in the crime" or (2) used or
threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is not a

"Serious bodily injury" is injury that "creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ,
or creates a substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (West 2004).
9

"'Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical
condition.'" Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3) (West 2004).
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participant in the crime" Jury Instruction 26, R.285, Addendum B. Because the elements of
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault applicable to the facts of this case are different,
defendant was properly convicted of both crimes. Accordingly, defendant's claim that the
trial court improperly instructed the jury fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 rd day of April, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202. Burglary
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion
of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5: or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event
it is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in Subsections
(l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in the building.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-202; Laws 2001, c. 359, § 1, eff April 30, 2001: Laws 2001, 1st
Sp.Sess., c. 4, § 2, eff. July 5, 2001: Laws 2003, c. 325, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any
person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under
Section 76-1-601.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-203; Laws 1988, c. 174, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 6.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely
to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 10; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 2;
Laws 1995, c. 291. $ 5, eff May L 1995.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode- Included offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not
be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant
is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An
offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court
on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to
support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found
every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment
of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered
for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by
the defendant.
©
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Addendum B

INSTRUCTION NO.

2?

Before you can convict the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, of the crime of Aggravated
Assault, as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 5th day of February, 2003, in Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, assaulted Marcus Anderson; and
2.

That the said defendant intentionally or knowingly assaulted Marcus Anderson;

3.

That the said defendant then and there intentionally caused serious bodily injury

and

to Marcus Anderson.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged in count II of the information. If, on
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count II.

Addendum C

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

^

Before you can convict the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, of the offense of Aggravated
Burglary as charged in count I of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 5th day of February, 2003, in Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, entered or remained in the dwelling of Marcus
Anderson and Antionette Ragsdale; and
2.

That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and

3.

That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and

4.

That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit an assault on

any person; and
5.

That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant or

another participant in the crime either:
(a)

caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in the

crime; or
(b)

used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon
against any person who is not a participant in the crime.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of the information. If, on
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I.
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Addendum D
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State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 20050072-CA
v.
Calvin Moore,
Defendant and Appellant,

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and McHugh.
This matter is before the court on' the Appellee's Motion to
Strike Extra-Record Information from Appellant's Opening Brief.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee's motion is granted.
Appellant is required to remove all references to documents not
included in the record on appeal and resubmit an amended brief
within fifteen days of the date of this order. Appellee shall
file its amended brief within fifteen days of the date
Appellant's amended brief is filed. Appellant shall file its
reply brief within thirty days after Appellee files its amended
brief.
DATED this

&

day of February, 2 006

FOR THE COURT:

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
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I hereby certify that on February 6, 2 006, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
BRETT J DELPORTO
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
RONALD S FUJINO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
356 E 900 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
Dated this February 6, 2 006.

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20050072
District Court No. 031900879

